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DAVID M. HUTMACHER VS. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF ELISHA HARRIS.

A block of wood was sold at an administrator's sale, without the knowledge of
either purchaser or seller that it contained, as was afterwards discovered, moneys,
notes, and other valuables, to a large amount. Held, that no title to the treasure
passed to the purchaser.

Error to the Common Pleas of Luzerne County.
This was an amicable action of trover and conversion for moneys,
notes, bonds, and valuables, amounting to $3,754 50, arising out of
the following state of facts :
Elisha Harris, during the last year prior to his decease, lived
alone. He was known or, at least, supposed to have a considerable
amount of money and obligations for moneys loaned to others. He
died, after an illness of some four days, in the fore part of July,
1858. His administrators, after diligent search, were unable to
find any trace of such moneys or obligations, and the inventory of
his personal estate amounted to only $357 34.
In August following, the personal property was sold at public
vendue, and, among other articles, a block of wood, three feet in
length, and ten by twelve inches square, apparently cut from a stick
of hewed timber, having a rough wheel of three feet in diameter,
attached horizontally on one side of the block, and a spindle passing
through the wheel, was exposed to sale, under the designation of a
drill, or turning machine, and was sold to the defendant for fifteen
cents.
He took it home, and his purchase exciting some derision among
his neighbors, he commenced splitting it up for fire-wood on the day
following his purchase. On splitting the block, a secret drawer and
recess were disclosed, in which were contained the articles in controversy in this suit.
I We are indebted
Am. L. Reg.

to the Luzerne Legal Observer for the report of this case.-Eds.
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The defendant had a list of the articles made out, and immediately reported the fact of their discovery, and has since interposed
no obstacle to the determination of the question of ownership.
The jury, under the charge of the Court, found a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, and judgment having been rendered, the defendant
sued out this writ, and here assigned the same for error.
Argument for the plaintiff in error.
The relation between plaintiff and defendant was that of vendor
ind vendee. If there were a mistake on the part of the plaintiff in
the article sold, how far does the law allow him a remedy? This
seems to be the inquiry.
Fraud, or misrepresentation, or deceit of any kind, by which
either party is imposed upon, vitiates all contracts: Story on Contracts, chap. xv., sec. 423. Neither of these causes existed here.
It was a mistake. A mistake or ignorance of a material fact,
under some circumstances, is voidable.
In a policy of insurance the underwriter received back a portion
of the premium where there was an error in the ownership of a part
of the goods: Pearson vs. Lord, 1 Mass. 81. So the endorser of
a note, who pays in ignorance of a want of protest, is relieved:
Garland vs. Salem Bank, 9 Mass. R. 40.
The sarie rule does not apply to vendor and vendee in courts of
equity where a specific decree is asked. With the vendor it is obligatory, but in the discretion of the Court with the vendee: 2
Comyn's Dig. 494, citing 2 Atk. 180.
"An actual misrepresentation, coupled with an intention to
deceive, even on a material point, will not invalidate a contract,
unless the false statement were the means which produced it: Phipps
vs. Buckman, 1 Cas. 401; 1J'_arland vs. NZ'ewman, 9 Watts, 57.
Where information is open to both parties, neither can complain:
Kintzing vs. .M'Blrath, 5 Barr, 469; .Fishervs. Bowall, 5 W. &S.
484; Belting's Appeal, 5 Harris, 216; 1 Story's Eq. secs. 190,
191, 197.
If the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the machine,
he was not bound to disclose it : 1 Story's Eq. sec. 147.
A party, in case of mutual mistake, should be put in as good
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position after as before sale: Conner vs. .ender8on, 15 Mass.
319.
But it may be said the defendant did not buy what he supposed
he bought, nor the vendor suppose hd was selling what he actually
did. There is an English or French decisioi, which I am unable to
obtain, of a sale of a painting, by one of the masters,-covered over
with a common and ordinary picture, to prevent its being taken in
some of the Italian campaigns. In this condition it was sold for a
small sum. The owner, afterwards finding out its value, failed to
recover-it back under the plea of mistake.
The bedstead of Richard III., many years after the battle of
Bosworth Field, was sold at that place, the owner finding the frame
and posts filled with sovereigns. Who owned them? A tropical
bird was sold recently in New Orleans, the owner finding in its craw
some valuable stones. Were these jewels sold with the bird ?
The Court below assumes that the administrator, acting in a fiduciary capacity, would be relieved as a matter of course, and that if
there cannot be a recovery back, he would be guilty of devastavit.
.Devastavitarises from negligence of the trust; Toll. Ex. 424. By
giving away, embezzling, consuming the decedent's estate, or by loss
which by ordinary prudence he could have prevented: Gordon's
Decedents, p. 264, citing 2 Vern. 289. Negligence, generally,
which cannot be applicable to the present case, because no degree
of prudence could have anticipated that any of the estate was concealed where it proved to be.
Does an administrator occupy a different position from an owner,
where a material fact in a contract should be unknown at the time
it was made?
If neither had the means of knowledge, it is difficult to say on
what principle there should be drawn a line of distinction.
Argument for the defendant in error.
The defendants in error contend that Hutmacher took, by his purchase, simply the block of wood or drill machine, that being the
definite article offered for sale, bid off, paid for by and delivered to
him. With the drill machine he became entitled to the essential
materials of which it was composed, its requisite appurtenances, and
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its mechanical adaptations for all lawful uses which ingenuity might
devise or skill and labor effect.
That the notes, contracts, money, and jewelry secreted therein
formed no part of, were not appurtenant thereto, nor were they, as
is conceded by the argument of the plaintiff in error, (if the contract
of sale be an intelligent act of concurrent assenting minds,) the subject offered for sale on the one side, or purchased by the other, and
that they did not therefore pass by the sale.
That title to the notes, &e., passed to Hutmacher, can be sustained only on the paradox that the administrator sold that which
he did not assent to the sale of, which he had not offered for sale,
part of which he could not by means of a. public sale give title to,
and for which he neither received nor contracted to receive a price ;
and that the plaintiff in error, purchased that which he did not bid
for nor pay for; or, more briefly, that the administrator contracted
to sell that which he did not contract to sell, and the purchaser to
buy what he did not contract to buy.
The contract of the sale is consensual,requiring assent, contains
reciprocal engagements, and requires the interchange of supposed
equivalents. It can be effected only where there are competent
parties, a mutual assent to certain terms, a definite subject to be sold,
and a certain price paid: Story on Sales, sec. 8. In order to transfer property in goods and chattels, by bill of sale or other instrument
of transfer, the chattel intended to be conveyed must be in existence,
and be ascertained and identified at the time of the execution of the
grant or transfer: Addison on Contracts, 220. The precise thing
sold must be ascertained and identified, except when the sale is of
undivided quantities, expressly sold as such: lb. 221.
There was here no delivery of the articles, in either of the three
modes recognized by law, Tb. 240, actual, symbolic, or constructive: Hilliard on Sales, 3.
Suppose that before the block was "set out beside the fence,"
and the fifteen cents paid, the administrator had discovered the concealed treasures, taken them out, and Hutmacher, tendering his fifteen cents, had brought his action "to recover the market value of
the goods at the time and place, when and where they ought to have
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been delivered:" Story on Sales, see. 448; or "the difference
between the value of the article delivered and the commodity sold :"
3 Rawle, 44. The removal of the block by Hutmacher, and payment of the fifteen cents, cannot change the rights of the parties,
or raise any implication, for the language of the counsel for the
plaintiff in error, "negligence," "cannot be applicable to this case,
because no degree of prhdence could have' anticipated that any of
the estate was concealed where it proved to .be."
The present bears some analogy to the case of treasure trove,
"which is when money or coin, gold, silver,.plate or bullion is found
hidden in the earth, or other private place, the owner thereof being
unknown, in which case the treasure belongs to the king: but if he
that hid it be afterwards found out, the owner and not the king is
entitled to it:" 1st Chit. B1. (in.) page 295. So far from acquiring
any rights therein, the penalty, formerly, of death, afterwards of
imprisonment, was the punishment of him who concealed from the
king such finding.
Passing to the question of mistake. The ignorance in this case
arose from a mistake of fact, not of law. And "in respect to mistakes of fact, the rule is, that no contract of sale is reciprocally
obligatory upon the parties thereto, if it be founded upon an injurious mistake of a material fact forming the basis of a contract,
although such mistake be occasioned by no fraud or imposition.
The only consideration is, whether the mistake is in respect to a
fact, which is material, and which would have modified or affected
the mind of either party, had it been known at the time the contract was made :" Story on Sales, see. 145; Brightly's Equity, sec.
48, et seq. "When a material mistake occurs in respect to the
nature of the subject-matter of the sale, there is no mutual assent,
and the contract is void:" Ib. sees. 148, 149, 151. See, also, Miles
vs. Stevens, 8 Barr, 21. If the article be an absolute value, as a
bar of silver which had been previously sent to the assayer, a mistake in respect to quantity or price would of necessity be material,
and therefore would afford good reason for annulling the contract:
Cox vs. Prentice, 3 Maule & Sel. 344; Story on Sales, sec. 154.
There is a manifest distinction between this and the case of the
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sale of the picture, cited by plaintiff in error, and of lands in
which is a mine, of the existence of which the vendor was ignorant
and the vendee had knowledge, when the ignorance of the vendor
does not of itself render the transaction fraudulent on the part of
the purchaser: Harris vs. Tyson, 12 Harris, 847, and cases cited.
All minerals, unless reserved, pass with the land-they are an essential part of it. Whether a chest of coin, plate, notes, and title
papers, concealed in a field, would pass by an ordinary grant of the
land, is a different question.
While neither party is in general bound to disclose extrinsic facts
to the other, yet even silence, under certain circumstances, is considered fraudulent, as of a purchaser of goods knowing himself to be
insolvent: 12 Pick. 311; the vendee of a picture known by vendor
to be under a delusion with respect to it: Eill vs. Gray, 1 Stark R.
352; the concealment by the corn merchant arriving at Rhodes
during a season of scarcity, of the fact of other relief at hand, as
discussed by Cicero: Cic. de Officiis, book 3. But in respect to
intrinsic qualities the rule is more rigid, and concealment of latent
defects by the vendor, and any misrepresentation or concealment,
or artifice of any kind, by which either party is injured, will furnish
a good ground in equity to set aside the contract: 1 Story's Eq.
Juris. see. 218, et seq.; Story on Sales, see. 179. Whilst there
was no concealment by Hutmacher-for there was no knowledge,
and nothing, therefore, to conceal at the time of his purchase-his
subsequent refusal, when discovered, to return the goods, taints his
act with the legal effects of fraudulent concealment.
The leading conclusions resulting from the fiduciary character of
the vendee, as a trustee for creditors and the representatives of the
decedent, and the effect upon the rights of the vendee, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court below. He could not, in
the character of administrator, make the kind of sale called in the
Roman law "i pei Emptio," whereby an expectation dependent
upon chance may be sold, and the sale of a drill machine, at fifteen
cents, be coupled with the chance of acquiring title to 84,000,
nearly the entire personal assets of the estate.
The citation of an ancient case, touching this kind of contract,
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may be excused as an off-set to the cases of the tropical bird and the
bedstead of Richard III. It is stated by Plutarch, in his Life of
Solon, 1st Plut. Lives, 205, that "when some Coans once were
drawing a net, some strangers at Miletus bought the draught unseen
at a venture. There chanced to come up a golden tripod, which
Helen, at her return from Troy, on the remembrance of an old
prophecy, had thrown in there-the strangers contesting with the
fishers about the tripod, and the cities espousing the quarrel so far
as to engage in war. Apollo, to end the controversy, advised that
the tripod be given to the wisest man." After passing around in
fruitless search from one to another, it eventually came back to the
temple of Apollo, and the Court, by reason of inability to decide
the case, became the owner of the subject-matter of the controversy.
In the sale of the effects of Rachel, the tragedienne, was a copy
of Shakspeare, containing between the leaves several one hundred
pound notes, unknown to her or her administrator. Held, that title
to the notes did not pass.
It is suggested that, under modern authorities, it would be held
that, as the contract was intended by both parties to refer only to
the fish which should be taken at the draught, and as the intent of
parties is to govern, the tripod was not included in the sale, and
belonged therefore to the fishermen.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-The ground on which we affirm this judgment
is, that there was no sale of the valuables contained in the block
of wood, which is called, in virtue of its horizontal wheel and
upright spindle, "a drill machine." Sale, said Mr. Justice Wayne,
in Williamson vs. Berry, 8 How. 544, is a word of precise legal
import, both at law and in equity. It means at all times a contract
between parties to pass rights of property for money which the
buyer pays or promises to pay to the seller for the thing bought
and sold.
That no such contract was made by these parties in respect to
the contents of the drill machine, we deduce from the agreed facts
of the case. The machine itself, and every essential part and constituent element of it were well sold. The consideration paid,
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though only fifteen cents, was in law a quid pro quo, and the sale,
unaffected by fraud or misrepresentation, passed to the purchaser
an indefeasible right to the machine, and all the uses and purposes
to which it could be applied. But the contents of the machine are
to be distinguished from its constituent parts. They were unknown
to the administrators, were not inventoried, were not exposed to
auction, and were not sold. Of course they were not bought. All
that was sold was fairly bought, and may be held by the purchasers.
The title to what was not sold remains unchanged. A sale of a
coat does not give title to the pocket-book which may happen to be
temporarily deposited in it; nor the sale of a chest of drawers a
title to the deposits therein. In these cases, and in many others
that are easily imagined, the contents are not essential to the existence or usefulness of the thing contracted for, and not being within
the contemplation or intention of the contracting parties, do not pass
by the sale. The contract of sale, like all other contracts, is to be
controlled by the clearly-ascertained intention of the parties.
The argument proceeded very much on the doctrine that equity
will in certain cases relieve against mistakes of fact, as well as of
law; but if there was no contract of sale, there could be no mistake
of fact to vitiate it, and therefore that doctrine has no possible
application. Mistake is sometimes a ground of relief in equity;
but a man who puts his wares up at auction, and sells them to the
highest bidder, has no right to relief, on the ground that he was ignorant of the value of that which he sold. Such a mistake comes of
his own negligence, for it is his duty to possess all necessary knowledge of the value of that which he fetches to market ; and the rule
is general, that if a party becomes remediless at law by his own
negligence, equity will leave him to bear the consequences.
Nor could these administrators, had they sold the contents, have
pleaded, in addition to their ignorance, their fiduciary character, and
their possible liability for a devastavit,in defeat of the vested rights
of the purchaser ; for in respect of the personalty of the decedent,
they stood in the dead man's shoes, and were in fact, as they are
commonly called in law, his personal representatives.' The law casts
the personal estate upon them for purposes of admin'stration, and
27
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a fair sale made in pursuit of that purpose would confer as perfect
a title as if made by a living owner.

They, no more than any other

vendor, could set aside such a sale to avert the consequences of
their own negligence.
But inasmuch as they did not, in point of fact, sell the valuables
which are in dispute, these principles, and all the arguments drawn
from the law of mistakes, are outside of the case.
If, then, there was no sale and purchase of the contents of the
block or machine, how did Hutmacher, when he discovered his
unsuspected wealth, hold it? Evidently as treasure trove, which,
though commonly defined as gold or silver hidde4 in the ground,
may, in our commercial day, be taken to include the paper representatives of gold and silver, especially when they are found hidden,
as in this instance, with both of these precious metals. And it is
not necessary that the hiding should be in the ground, for we are
told in 3 Inst. 132, that it is not "material whether it be of ancient
time hidden in the ground, or in the roof, or walls, or other part of
a house, building, ruins, or elsewhere."
The certain rule of the common law, in regard to treasure trove,
as laid down by Bracton, Lib. 3, cap. 3, and as quoted in Viner's
Abridgment, is, that "he to whom the property is, shall have treasure trove, and, if he die before it be found, his executors shall have
it, for nothing accrues to the king, unless when no one knows who
owns that treasure." The civil law gave it to the finder, according to
the law of nature, and we suppose it was this principle of natural
-law that was referred to in what was said of treasure hid in a field,
in Matthew's Gospel, xiii. 44.
But the common law, which we administer, gave it always to the
owner if he could be found, and if he could not be, then to the king:
as wrecks, strays, and other goods are given, "whereof no person
can claim property ;" 3 Inst. 132. Hutmacher, therefore, held the
unsold valuables for the personal representatives of the deceased
owner.
Severa sporadic cases, some of which were highly apocryphal,
were mentioned in the argument as affording analogies more or lessappropriate to this curious case, but it is quite unnecessary to dis-

CHAPMAN, LORD, WRIGHT & CO. vs. DEVEREUX & NOYES.

419

cuss them, because if they touch, they do not encumber the clear
ground whereon, as above indicated, we rest our judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.

Supreme Court, Butland County, January Term, 1860.
CHAPMAN, LORD, WRIGHT & CO. VS. DEVEREUX & NOYES.
1. A and B were two accredited agents of the New England Protective Union-A
for the making of purchases, and B for the selling of produce. By the rules of
the association, all purchases were required to be for cash, and not on credit;
and this rule was known to both plaintiffs and defendants. A purchased from C,
the defendant, goods to the value of $9,000 on credit, but without the knowledge
of B. Held, That no partnership existed between A and B, by which the latter
could be compelled to pay the debts incurred by the former, for the purchase of
goods on credit, without B's knowledge, in violation of the express terms of the
partnership, known to the plaintiffs, and in the absence of any fraud -or deception
practised upon them.
2. Where no credit is given, and no expectation, originally, of looking to one
partner for debts incurred by the other, no recovery against the former can be
had.
3. Where C, the plaintiff, trusted A, one of the defendants, who were partners, in
violation of the rule of the partnership, which C ought to have or might have
known by inquiry, and in the absence of any deception, he cannot look to B,
the other partner, for payment of his debt, because such debt wa' contracted
without the scope of the partnership, and upon the individual liability of A.
4. Partnership defined to be a joint interest in the net profits of an adventure or
business, or in the profits as affected by the losses.

This was an action of book account, referred to auditors, who
made a special report. By the law and practice of the co.urts in
this State the courts before which the case comes for judgment may
make such inferences of facts in addition to the special finding as
seems just and reasonable.
The two defendants were the accredited agents, in Boston, for
the New England Protective Union, Devereux for making purchases,
and Noyes for selling produce. They entered upon the .duties of
their respective agencies about the beginning of the year 1853, and
continued until 1857, during which period, and after the beginning
of 1856, the plaintiffs' account accrued.
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Devereux succeeded one Kaulback as purchasing agent, and at
the time purchased of Kaulback a store of goods, and gave him a
note for part of the price, signed Devereux & Noyes.
Devereux & Noyes jointly hired a store in Boston, which was
occupied for the business of the central agency there from 1852
to 1857, and also a cellar. Noyes occupied two stories of the store
in the produce department, and the cellar. The sign over his door
was "Win. P. Noyes," and Devereux had his name over his door,
and across the whole building was the sign, "New England Protective Union." Each did the business of his department in his own
name. Each hired and controlled the help in his own department.
Devereux, in making purchases generally, and always with plaintiffs, furnished his own bill heads, debiting the Division in question
to himself, which by the vendor were filled up with the list and
prices of the articles, and sent to the Division, where the order was
filled, and the goods, in case of a credit, charged to such Division.
Devereux then gave his receipt for the bill, and it was posted to
him by the seller and by him debited to the Division, according to
the bills already forwarded.
But the constitution and by-laws of these associations required
in all cases cash payments, and no credit, and this was known to
the plaintiffs and to both defendants, and the practice of posting
the bills to Devereux, instead of demanding cash, was in violation of
Lis duty as purchasing agent, whether the credit was long or short.
From 1853 to 1855 Devereux dealt with the subdivisions out of
the store in filling orders, and on the 1st February, 1855, the store
was transferred to Noyes, without being moved, and after that
Devereux purchased of Noyes to fill orders of the Divisions, the
same as of other parties. The stock of goods during all the time
was replenished by the use of funds arising in the business of the
agency. No charge of the goods was made to Noyes, and no credit
made by him for them. Neither Devereux nor Noyes put any funds
into the business except what arose from the agency.
From February, 1852, until 1854, Noyes paid over the money
received on sale of produce to the cashier in Devereux's department,
unless otherwise ordered by the consignors, and he also paid over to
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the same cashier the avails of consignments outside of the Union,
and the amount was by him paid to the consignors. Noyes during
this time kept no account at bank.
The larger part of the expenses of both departments, including
rents, repairs, fuel, wages to clerks and laborers, insurance on
goods, &c., were paid by this same cashier, and no separate accounts
kept. Insurance on goods in the store was made in both departments to defendants jointly. Both parties used coal out of the
same pile, without any account. The same cashier paid sundry
accounts against Noyes between February, 1853, and February,
1855, for oil, paper hangings, soap, tobacco, and boots, and for
wages of clerks, some of whom made their bills in the name of
Devereux & Noyes, but it did not appear this was known to Noyes.
Immediately after the appointment of Devereux as purchasing
agent it was understood between him and Noyes that the commissions in both departments should be equally divided.
It was then understood by them that the business was to be done
for cash and not on credit, according tolthe rules of the association,
and it did not appear that Noyes, at any time during the period
of the business, had any knowledge that D. had purchased goods
in his department on credit, or that plaintiffs had sold him on time
upon the strength of Noyes' credit. But it did. appear that Devereux and his clerks, in making purchases of plaintiffs and others,
represented that N~oyes was a partner of Devereux, but plaintiffs
never, at any time, made any claim of liability against Noyes until
this suit, and there was no evidence that Noyes had any knowledge
that he had been represented as Devereux's partner.
All purchases of plaintiffs by Devereux were on thirty days' time,
which they did not regard as on credit. The plaintiffs' claim was
about $9,000.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
REDFIELD, On. J.-The general principles of law affecting this
case are not much controverted. But there is a most unquestionable
conflict in the decisions of the courts in regard to their application
to particular cases. It was decided in this court, in Brigham vs.
Dana, 29 Vt. R. 1, that persons jointly interested in the net profits
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of an adventure or business, or in the profits as affected by the
losses, are partners. And the same point was so ruled by this
court much earlier, in the case of Kellogg vs. Griswold, 12 Vt. PL.
291, and in a recent very able judgment of METCALF, J., in Fitch
vs. Harrington,8 Law Register, 688. Chief Justice Marshall, in
Winship vs. The Bae of the United States, 5 Peters' R. 529,
uses language to the same effect: "One who shares in the profit,
although his name be not in the firm, is responsible for all its debts."
The distinguished Chief Justice uses another form of expression in
this connection, which may be found to have some application possibly to another portion of this case: "A partner, certainly the
acting partner, has power to transact the whole business of the firm,
WHATEVER THAT MAY BE: [but surely nothing beyond that:] and,

consequently, to bind his partners to such transactions as entirely
as himself."
This seems to bring out the prominent inquiry or inquiries in this
case.
I. Was there any credit given in this case to Noyes?
II. If not, were the plaintiffs ignorant, at the time of the credit,
of Noyes' true relations to Devereux, and to this purchase on credit?
III. Was there any such connection between the defendants, in
any portion of their business, as to create a strict partnership
between themselves ?
IV. If so, was this credit so far within the range of the contemplated business of the firm, either as originally constituted, or
subsequently extended, by the consent or with the knowledge of
Noyes, as to render Noyes liable to the plaintiffs ?
The law of the case will best be discussed further in connection
with the answer to these several inquiries, and the leading facts
found in the case.
The facts in this case are very imperfectly and somewhat indefinitely reportei. We presume the auditors could have answered
some questions, incidentally affecting the case, much more satisfactorily than this court. But as the auditors and the county court
have seen fit to send the case here on this report, with a pro forma
judgment for the plaintiffs, we must dispose of it, with the best
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lights which we can obtain, or remit such questions to the auditors
as seem not satisfactorily answered by the report.
1. We understand that while the account was accruing, the plaintiffs were told by Devereux or his clerks that Noyes was a partner.
This was while the transaction was passing, and while the plaintiffs
might have learned all the facts of the true relations between the
defendants. . They could ceitainly have learned, upon the slightest
inquiry, in the immediate vicinity of their own place of business,
how the business of this double agency was conducted. They might
probably have learned everything now shown in the case, unless it
was the fact that the defendants had agreed to divide the profits of
the two agencies equally. And there is nothing in the case to show
that even that was intended to be kept secret. It would rather
seem from the manner in which the business of the agency was
conducted, that even the division of the profits was not kept secret.
2. We understand that the plaintiffs gave the credit to Devereux,
took his receipt for the bills, and posted the acdount to him, and
made no claim that Noyes was responsible to them in any way
until the commencement of this suit.
8. Under this state of the case it seems to us the plaintiffs must
show that, by contract between the defendants, Devereux was
justified in obtaining the goods of the plaintiffs' on the credit of
Noyes, or that some fraud was practised in the case.
Short of that it does not appear to us the plaintiffs have any just
claim to hold Noyes responsible. For they either knew or might
readily have learned all the facts in the case, and still after hearing
the suggestion that Noyes was a partner, they continued to deal
with Devereux as the sole party in interest, to give credit exclusively to him, and to make no claim whatever upon Noyes. Upon
what ground, then, is it competent for the plaintiffs now to hold
Noyes liable?
We readily perceive that, to a certain extent, a partnership did
exist between the defendants as to their business in the agency, and
probably in the store of goods which was kept in connection with
the agency, sometimes by one party and sometimes by the other.
But even in this view, we do not understand that the purchases of
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the plaintiffs came fairly within the range of the copartnership
business. The agency certainly did not authorize the purchasing
agent to buy on credit. The very fundamental principle of the
whole scheme of these protective unions, we understand, is that
they shall not buy upon credit, but for money in hand. And
although, by a kind of false gloss, the merchants and. other traders
and business men in Boston, and some other cities, probably, have
got up some conventional arrangement among themselves by which
they agree that a sale or. purchase on thirty days' indulgence shall
not be regarded as upon credit, but a cash transaction, this certainly does not make it so in fact: If any term of credit is not
credit, then no term of credit is credit, and the very import of the
term is abolished and expunged, and the thing becomes impossible:
We know that usage and custom -will accomplish almost anything
except impossibilities. But when it proposes to change the import
of language it does not thereby change the nature of things. This
same absurd attempt to convert a credit of thirty days into no credit
at all may be turned against the plaintiffs as well as in their favor.
If thirty days' indulgence is cash in hand, then, of course, the plaintiffs gave no credit to any one, and have no claim against any one,
because forsooth a credit of thirty days is cash in hand, and by
consequence no credit was given, and no debt was created, the
plaintiffs were paid for their goods at the time of delivery, and have
no occasion and no claim to maintain this action against ony one.
This Court held this pretended custom void in (atlin vs. Smith,
24 Yt. R. 85. We have no occasion to say more about it. It was
undoubtedly a credit, but, as we have before said, clearly a credit
to Devereux and not to Noyes.
We think, too, it is equally obvious that the plaintiffs must be regarded as having knowledge, either in fact of the whole transaction
and of the true relation between the defendants as to the manner
of transacting the business of the double agency, or else that they
had such knowledge as was ample for putting them upon inquiry,
and that such inquiry would have resulted in the discovery of all
the facts substantially as they existed. This being so the plaintiffs
are affected with the knowledge of all the facts which existed, and
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which upon reasonable inquiry might have been ascertained. So
that in this view of the case the plaintiffs must be regarded as having elected to give credit to Devereux alone, treating the credit as
so short and so much in the nature of ready pay that they probably
regarded the responsibility of Devereux as sufficient.
But, in addition to this, it seems to us that from the fact that
plaintiffs appear to have been one of the principal houses where the
purchasing agent of this New England Protective Union dealt, (we
infer this from the amount of business done with them, and the fact
that it extended over a considerable period,) from these facts; theb,
and the general notoriety of the no credit basis of these protective
unions, it seems to us fair to conclude that the plaintiffs must be
affected with notice in fact that this purchasing agent was to purchase only for ready pay, and that he was not therefore justified in
obtaining credit; and that although we recognize the defendants
as partners, to a limited extent, that is so far as the agency and the
store are concerned, as we probably should be inclined to do, it will
not entitle the plaintiffs to recover of Noyes.
The case in this last view will come within the principle of those
cases where the party giving credit to one partner, knowing there
are others in the same house, knows, also, that the credit is not justi
fled by the terms of the association and the expectation of the other
partners. As; for instance, where there are two houses having
some members in common and others distinct. One who gives
credit to the active partner, in one house, for goods going to that
house, cannot hold the members of the other house responsible. Or,
when a partnership exists where, by articles of association, the business is to be transacted without credit, and this is known to one
who gives credit to one of the partners, or even to the whole house,
upon the representation of one member, that it will be paid shortly,
the creditor knowing, at the same time, that, by the articles of association, and the expectation of the other paptners, no credit is to be
obtained, such person cannot recover of the other partners. This
is familiar law upon both points. Story on Part. § 128, et seq.
Here it is laid down as clear law, that if the person dealing with one
partner, although the business come fairly within the range of the
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partnership, yet if the creditor knows, at the time of giving credit, that
the articles of association do not juptify the sale on credit, or not
upon the credit of all the partners, and that the other partners do
not expect to be liable for any such contract, and are not to become
liable, as between themselves, he cannot bind them, notwithstanding
the creditor may have an implicit expectation that he shall thereby
obtain the responsibility of the firm, and may even make his contract in the name of the partnership. This point was expressly
decided by this Court in .Hastings vs. _Hopkin8on, 28 Vt. R. 108.
So, also, in regard to the other point it seems equally well settled,
that if the contract is made with one partner and in his name alone,
the creditor knowing of the partnership at the time, if it turns out
that the partner was not justified in making the contract on behalf
of the firm, they are not responsible, and this is so, notwithstanding
the creditor might have entertained an implicit expectation that the
firm would consent to be liable to him or were in fact liable. Story
on Part. § 154; Collyer on Part. B. 8, ch. L. § 2. This point was
vs. Gkandler, 32 Vt. R.
recently decided by this Court in (not yet published.)
If, then, we assume that a partnership quoad the agency, and the
store of goods did exist between the defendants, and this is the most
which can be claimed, as the utmost which the testimony tends to
prove, it is still obvious that as to the agency therb was nothing,
either in the constitution and by-laws of the union, or in any presumed understanding between these partners growing out of the
previous mode of transacting the business, which would justify
Devereux in purchasing goods for the Divisions upon the credit of
Noyes, so far as Devereux and Noyes were concerned, very likely
Devereux, from the fact of being a partner of Noyes, might do this
to the extent of the partnership business, so far as third persons
were concerned, who were wholly ignorant of the extent of his
authority, and so might purchase of those who did not understand
the laws of this agency and the extent of the connection between the
defendants, and do this on credit of the firm. But that is not the
case of the plaintiffs.
They have such knowledge upon the subject that they should be con-
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tent to stand upon the actual authority of Devereux, as between himself and Noyes. And here it does not seem to us, as the case stands
in this Court, there is any good ground to claim that Devereux hadany
express or reasonably implied authority to bind Noyes to this credit.
It does not appear to us that the plaintiffs had any such belief
or expectation at the time, or, if they had, they certainly elected to
give credit exclusively to Devereux, and that would release Noyes
from all legal or moral obligation in the matter.
We do not perceive that any such facts were kept from the
knowledge or possible apprehension and discovery of plaintiffs as
will justify this Court in saying that a virtual fraud was thereby
practiced upon them, and thus enabled them to go against Noyes,
as well as Devereux, upon that ground.
We feel compelled, therefore, as the case stands before us, and
with the best lights we can obtain from surrounding circumstances,
to say that it seems to us the phintiffs have not shown any satisfactory grounds for claiming judgment against Noyes.
The result of our investigtions has been to answer the inquiries
we at first proposed in such a manner as not to entitle the plaintiffs
to recover of Noyes. It will have been perceived that as we construe the facts found by the auditors,
I. There was no fraud or deception practiced upon the plaintiffs.
They knew or had the means of learning all the facts in the case
important to their interest.
IL They gave no credit to Noyes, and had no expectation originally of looking to him for pay.
IIL The relation of partnership, if any, which existed between
Devereux and Noyes, only extended to the store of goods and the
conduct of the agency, according to its legitimate terms.
IV. The dealings of the plaintiffs, so far' as any credit was given
to Noyes, did not come fairly within the scope of the partnership,
as in fact made or as understood by the plaintiffs.
\V. The plaintiffs' account having accrued neither in supplying the
store nor in supplying the purchasing agent, in buying according to
his duty and the terms of the partnership, they cannot claim to hold
Noyes by the terms of the partnership.
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VI. They cannot claim to hold him on the ground that the scope
of the partnership was enlarged by his acquiescence so as to allow.
Devereux to buy for the Division on his credit, or that of the firm,
since the plaintiffs were conversant of this credit, being without the
limits of the legitimate business, both of the agency and the partnership, and were themselves as much in fault as any one, in suffering
the extension, and far more so than Noyes, and it was evidently
suffered by the plaintiffs with the full knowledge and expectation
that they could look only to Devereux.
As we construe the facts reported, and we see no reason to question its correctness, the plaintiffs have no claim either in law or
justice to now hold Noyes responsible for their claim.
We must therefore reverse the judgment, and enter up final judgment for defendants.

In the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
COLYAR, vs. TAYLOR.
1. The unauthorized delivery of a thing bailed, by the mandatory to a stranger,
will make the mandatory responsible for the loss, on the ground of the violation
of his trust.
2. Such unauthorized delivery of the property by the mandatory to a third person
may be treated as a conversion by the bailor.
3. Where A, the bailor, entrusted a sum of money to B, the bailee, who gratuitously undertook to carry it for A, and then handed it over to C, a third person,

without the knowledge or assent of A, C undertaking the bailment, also without reward, and, while engaged in such duty, lost the money, by having his
pocket picked, it was held that B was liable to A.
4. A bailee without hire is responsible for gross negligence. "Gross negligence"
defined.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
McKINNEi, J.-This was an action on the case brought by
Colyar against Taylor, to subject the latter to the loss of fifteen
hundred dollars, money of the plaintiff, which came, at his request,
into the possession of the defendant, in pursuance of his previous
gratuitous undertaking to the plaintiff, to receive the money at
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Nashville, for the plaintiff, and deliver it toshim at Winchester, at

which place both parties resided.
Judgment was for the defendant, to reverse which an appeal in
error was prosecuted to this Court,
The error assigned is upon the instructions of the Court to the
jury.
The statement of a mere outline of the case, without going into
the particulars of the proof, will be sufficient for the understanding
of the question submitted for our determination.
The defendant, after receiving the- money, (which was in bank
notes,) took it with him, in his pocket, to the public "fair-ground,"
in the vicinity of Nashville, where were assembled a large crowd of
persons. Tn the evening, the defendant applied to J. H. Estell, of
Winchester, who intended returning home that night, to take charge
of the money for the plaintiff, stating, that he, defendant, would
not return for a day or two. Estell consented to do so, and, thereupon, the defendant took him aside a few steps from the crowd of
persons on the fair-ground and handed the money to him. Estell
placed the money in his pocket-book, which he deposited in the
pocket of his pantaloons. Shortly afterwards, Estell got upon the
train, not far distant from the fair-ground. The cars were thronged
with passengers, so much so that Estell had to make his way
through the crowd, from the second to the farther end of the fourth
car, before he found a seat. Soon after taking his seat, he discovered that his pocket was picked. The train was stopped, and
he got off, and after walking back about a mile, he found his pocketbook lying on the track of the road, rifled of its contents.
His honor, among other things, instructed the jury in substance:
That if the defendant received the money, to be carried gratuitously
to the plaintiff, and without any authority from the plaintiff to
entrust the money to Estell, the defendant delivered it to him to be
carried to the plaintiff, and it was afterwards lost, by the negligence of Estell, that, of itself, in the absence of, negligence
on the part of defendant, would not make him responsible for the
loss. * * * That the defendant would not be respo'nsible for
the loss, unless he was guilty of gross negligence. * * * That
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if Estell "was a suitable person to confide such a trust in," the
defendant would not be responsible to plaintiff for the loss of the
money.
It is insisted for the plaintiff in error, that this instruction is
erroneous, and such is our opinion.
We are aware of no sound principle or authority by which a
bailee of any sort may, as a general rule, take it upon himself to
,part with the possession of the property bailed to him, without
authority to do so from the bailor.
A bailment creates a trust. And though it is true that the
responsibility of a mandatory or bailee, without compensation, is,
in most respects, of a lower degree than that of other bailees, still
his engagement places him in the relation of a trustee, so far as to
exact of him fidelity in the execution of the trust assumed upon
himself, and, also, to bring him within the scope of the general principle, applicable to all trustees, that the office or duties of his trust
cannot be delegated by him to another without authority. The
performance of the trust is a matter of personal confidence, which
it is a breach of trust in the trustee to make over to a stranger;
and the original trustee will continue responsible for all the acts of
the person so substituted. Hill on Trustees, (ed. of 1854,) 248,
791.
Upon this principle, it seems to us that the unauthorized delivery
of the thing bailed, by the mandatory to a stranger, would make
him responsible for the loss, on the ground of the violation of his
trust.
But, again, such a delivery of the property to a third person is
treated as a conversion.
In some cases, the bailor has an election to sue on the bailee's
implied contract, or to waive the contract and resort to case or
trover, according to the nature of the injury. Edwards on Bailments, 116. Trover will not lie on the ground of negligence, on the
part of the bailee. This action proceeds upon the ground of his
wrongful assumption of the right of property, by delivering it to
a third person without authority: this amounts to a conversion.
24 Wend. 169; 9 John's. Rep. 861; Edwards on Bailments, 114.
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Accordingly, in Syed vs. Hay, 4 Term Rep. 260, it is held, that
if a mandatory, intrusted with the goods of another, puts them into
the hands of a third person, contrary to orders, it is a conversion.
And it is plain that the delivery of the goods to a third person,
without authority to do so, is the same, in principle, as a delivery
contrary to orders.
So it is held that even where the bailor has repossessed himself
of the thing bailed, the action may be maintained for. the breach of
trust, which is a conversion. 2 Esp. N. P. 190, 191; 1 Cowen's
Rep. 240; Edwards on Bailments, 129.
And, in Stewart 'vs. Frazier, 5 Ala. Rep. 114, it was held, that
on a deposit or bailment of money, to be kept without recompense,
if the bailee, without authority, attempt to transmit the money to
the bailor, at a distant point, by mail or private conveyance, and
the money is lost, he is responsible: though, in general, this would
not be the case in respect to money received for the use of another,
and transmitted to him by the usual conveyance. Edwards on
Bailments, 73.
These cases, and others of similar import, to be found in the
books, whatever may be the form of action, all proceed from the
doctrine, that the engagement of the mandatory is of the nature of
a trust, in the execution of which strict fidelity is required by him,
Ibid. 105. Hence, as we have seen, if he parts with the possession
of the thing bailed to a stranger, without authority, it is a violation
of his trust, for which he will be liable.
So, if a specific direction accompanies the bailment, it must be
complied with strictly, and any substantial deviation therefrom
will, in general, render the bailee liable.
In Story on Bailments, sec. 188, it is laid down that the rule that
a mandatory or bailee, without compensation, is responsible only for
gross negligence, " applies solely to cases where the mandatory is in
the actual performance of some act or duty entrusted to mini
in regard
to the property ; for, if he violates his trust by a misuser of the
property, or does any other act inconsistent with his contract, or in
fraud of it, he will be clearly liable for all losses and injuries resulting therefrom."
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Now, it is obvious that the delivery of the thing bailed, especially
a large sum of money, by the bailee to a third person, without
authority, is not an "act or duty entrusted to him in tegard to it,"
but a manifest violation of the trust, wholly inconsistent with his
implied undertaking to the bailor, and in fraud of it.
And the author adds, in the same section, that, "in cases of
misuser, especially such misuser as amounts to evidence of a conversion, it is, perhaps, strictly true, that any subsequent loss and
injury, whether it is by accident or otherwise, will be at the risk of
the mandatory."
Upon the foregoing authoritics, it follows that the defendant is
liable on the ground of a conversion of the money.
In the next place, we are at a loss to see how the defendant can
escape liability on the ground of gross negligence.
The phrase, "gross negligence," used in the books to define the
degree of negligence, for which a mandatory is responsible, is so
vague in itself, so inapt to convey any precise idea, and so difficult
of application to the circumstances of particular cases, that some
confusion has been produced in the cases upon this subject from its
use, and the same remark is true as respects the phrase, "slight
diligence."
Diligence is a relative term, and what would amount to the requisite diligence at one time, in one situation, and under one set of circumstances, might not amount to it in another. 2 Kent's Com. 561.
The degree of care required of a mandatory is essentially
dependant upon the circumstances of the case. The general principle governing his liability is, indeed, the same in all cases, but its
application is materially affected and varied by the circumstances
of each particular case.
The bailor's trusting the bailee with the goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a careful management, Edwards on Bailments, 94, and imposes upon him a duty to exert himself in proportion to the exigence of the case. Ibid. 106. In Nelson vs. lacintosh, 1 Starkie's N. P. 188, Lord Ellenborough held, that though
a person does not carry for hire, yet he is bound to take proper and
prudent care of that which is committed to him.
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The duty of a person employed without remuneration is to act
faithfully and honestly, and not to be guilty of any gross or corrupt
neglect in the discharge of that which he undertakes to do: Dartnall
vs. Howard, 4 Barn. & Cress. 345.
It is not always enough that the mandatory takes the same care
of the goods entrusted to him that he does of his own, if that fall
short of what is required. In Tracey vs. Wood, 3 Mason's Rep. 132,
the mandatory was held liable where he had taken the same care
of the bailor's money as of his own ; or, more properly, when
he had been guilty of equal negligence with regard to both.
The correctness of the general principle, that a mere mandatory
is liable only for "gross negligence," is not to be questioned,
when properly understood. Hence, if the goods be wrested from
him by robbery, or taken by theft, or destroyed by fire or violence,
without gross neglect on his part, he will not be liable.
But it must be kept in view, that this general principle, that a
mandatory is only liable for gross neglect, implies strict fidelity on
his part, and the exercise of such care and prudence as, with reference to the particular subject of the bailment, and the circumstances of the particular case, may be requisite for the performance
of his undertaking. Judge Story says, see. 186, that the degree of
care. which a mandatory may be required to exert must be materially affected by the nature and value of the goods, and their
liability to loss or injury.
That care and diligence, which would be sufficient, as to goods of
small value or of slight temptation, might be wholly unfit for goods of
great value, and very liable to loss and injury. In the former case,
the same acts might be deemed slight neglect only, which, in
respect to the latter, might justly be deemed gross neglect.
Perhaps, he adds, the best general test is to consider whether
the mandatory has omitted that care, which bailees, without hire or
other mandatories of common prudence, are accustomed to take of
property of the like description: Story on Bailments, see. 186.
And, in sec. 15, the author says: The bailee ought to proportion
his case to the injury or loss which is likely to be sustained by any
improvidence on his part.
28
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Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it seems
to us that the conduct of defendant in withdrawing the money from
the bank, and taking it with him to a place known to be generally
frequented by swindlers and pickpockets, and there, in public,
within a few steps of the promiscuous crowd, attempting to count the
money before delivering it to Estell, evinced such a degree of heedless incaution and disregard of common prudence as may justly be
considered as amounting to the grossest negligence. The case
under consideration does not require that we should notice the
question, whether a delivery of the property to a stranger might
not be excused or justified, upon the ground of an implied authority
to be gathered from all the circumstances of the case, or upon the
ground of an apparent or actual necessity for so doing. We, therefore, intimate no opinion upon these questions.
The point, as to the delivery of the subject of the bailment to a
stranger, was involved in the case of Knitland vs. Montgomery, 1
Swan. 452. But the question was not examined in that case, nor
was it expressly decided ; though, it is true, the casual observations
and intimation thrown out in that-case tend to a different conclusion from that to which we have arrived in the present case.
And by that case his honor was influenced in his charge, perhaps
contrary to his own view of the law.
If will be observed that we have abstained from any notice of the
facts of the case, prior to the defendant's actual reception of the
money at Nashville ; inasmuch, as the portion of the charge submitted for our consideration, and the discussion upon it, presented no
question upon the other facts.
Judgment reversed.

CHEESBROUGH vs. TAYLOR.

In the -New York Court of Common .Plea.
ELLSWORTH CHEESDROUGH VS. WILLIAM TAYLOR, EXECUTOR, &C.

1. An innkeeper can set up no excuse for the loss of his guest's baggage, except
the act of God, the act of public enemies, or the guest's own negligence.
2. Where the guest at a hotel delivered his baggage to an express agent, who delivered it at the hotel, and the delivery at the hotel was admitted by the innkeeper, and the guest subsequently left the hotel under the belief that his baggage
was accompanying him, but it subsequently turned out that one trunk did not
leave with him, and the guest intending to return in a few days made at that
time no inquiry about the lost trunk, and did not return for five or six weeks,
and then for the first time demanded his trunk, and made known to the innkeeper its loss, who made diligent efforts to recover it by advertisement and
inquiry; held, that this was not such negligence on the part of guest as to
excuse the liability of the innkeeper in his capacity as such.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
HILTON, J.-The plaintiff proved at the trial that on July 12,
1858, he came to this city from East Chester by the New Haven
Railroad, having with him four trunks, checked in the usual manner.
On arriving at the railroad depot, he gave to Studley's express
agent the four checks, with directions to deliver three of the trunks
at the International Hotel, and one on board of the Stonington
boat. The driver of the express wagon, on the same day, delivered
at the hotel three pieces of baggage, one of which, he recollects, was
a large trunk ; and they were so delivered by him as the baggage
of the plaintiff. On the plaintiff's arriving at the hotel, a short time
afterward, he inquired 'of the porter whether his baggage had
arrived. Being asked how many pieces, he answered, "Three
trunks," and the porter replied, "It's all right." While he remained, but one of the trunks was sent to his room, it being the
habit of the hotel to send only such baggage to the room of a guest
as should be so ordered, that which was not needed being kept in a
room appropriated to the purpose. On the 17th of July, the plaintiff left the hotel in a carriage, accompanied by his wife, for the
Hudson River Railroad station. Before leaving, and when paying
his bill at the hotel, he told them to put his baggage on, and he
supposed it was on; but he noticed when taking it off at the station
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that one of the trunks was missing. Having his wife to attend to,
however, the'driver of the carriage got off before he could see him.
Expecting to return to the city in about ten days, he was detained
longer, and did not get back in five or six weeks, when he went to
the hotel and inquired for the missing trunk, but it could not be
found, lie gave a description of it, with the contents, from which
the defendant made up an advertisement of the loss and inserted it
in the Herald; but the trunk has never been recovered. Its contents were proven to be worth $279, exclusive of a tiger-skin laprobe, belonging to the plaintiff's wife, and of the value of $50; but
as the action had been originally commenced in a district court,
and was removed to this court, under the provisions of the District
Court Act of 1857, it was assumed by both parties at the trial that
no recovery could be had beyond $250, and for this amount the
jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Thus far I have stated from the plaintiff's evidence ; and as the
witnesses were not impeached in any way, it is not necessary, upon
an - appeal taken, as in the present case, for the purpose of setting
aside a verdict, to look further into the testimony than to see that
it, in any aspect, supports the finding of the jury; but here I may
go further, as the defendant did not, in my opinion, produce any
proof of a character sufficiently positive to justify the jury in
coming to any other conclusion than the one they did. The most
that can be said of the defendant's evidence is, that it tended to
show negligence on the part of the plaintiff, contributing, in a slight
degree, to the loss c6mplained of; but the jury, under proper
instructions from the presiding judge, seem to have been of the
opinion that the plaintiff was not negligent to such an extent as to
relieve the defendant from his liability; and, from a careful reading
of the testimony, I cannot say that I differ from them.
During the trial many exceptions to the evidence were taken by
the defendant's counsel, but none of them seem to me material to
be considered. The exception to the proof of the value of the
tiger-skin lap-robe was interposed after the witness had given his
testimony respecting it, without objection; and the objection to the
witness, Taylor, testifying to the value of the-articles contained in
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the trunk was properly overruled, as it appeared that she had frequently purchased such, and had also seen others do so, and knew
their price.
Up to this point, the case, it must be confessed, presents no
novel features beyond those which usually attend the trial of an
action by a traveller against an innkeeper for the loss of baggage
intrusted to his keeping. The defendant, by his answer, having
admitted that the plaintiff came as a guest, the questions for submission to the jury for determination were, whether the trunk came
to the custody of the defendant? and, if so, was it afterward delivered to the plaintiff, or was it lost through his neglect or fault,
either direct or implied? Clute vs. Wiggins, 14 Johns. 175;
3l1'Donald vs. Edgerton, 5 Barb. 560; 2 Hilliard on Torts, 613;
Platt vs. Hibbard, 7 Cowen, 499. It was not necessary that
negligence on the part of the defendant should have been established
by proof to make him liable for the loss; nor was evidence of a
formal demand requisite, as it appeared that after diligent search
and inquiry the trunk could not be found, and was not produced
when called for: Willard vs. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith, 148.
In submitting such a case to the consideration of a jury, there
would not, it appears to me, exist a necessity for the presiding
judge commenting at any particular length upon the facts involved,
or stating many distinct propositions of law as connected with
those facts, and required to be kept in view by the jury as guides
to their determination; but the counsel for the defendant at the
trial seems to have thought otherwise. Before the charge was
made, he applied for a dismissal of the complaint upon five distinct
grounds. That being refused, he presented twenty-two separate
propositions or requests to charge, ten of which the judge disposed
of to his satisfaction, while to the refusal to charge favorably on
the remaining twelve, exceptions were taken in due form. The
charge itself was then attacked in detail, every proposition or
statement in it forming the subject of an exception, by which eight
additional exceptions are presented to us, one being of a compound
character. To each and all of these I have given a careful consideration, and as they can be reduced to and comprised within the
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proposition contained in the defendant's ninth point, viz: "that
the charge was calculated to and, no doubt, did mislead the jury,"
I am relieved from the necessity of considering each separately.
The case sets out the charge at some length, but it was in substance: That the jury should first determine whether the trunk was
delivered to the defendant, and, if so, that he was bound to produce
it on demand, or satisfactorily account for its non-production.
Regarding him as an innkeeper, nothing would excuse him for the
loss but the act of God, or the public enemies, or the negligence of
the plaintiff; or if regarded as an ordinary bailee, it was equally
incumbent upon him to account for the loss of a trunk committed
to his care and custody, by showing such a state of facts as would
repel the presumption of its loss having resulted through his negligence or want of ordinary care.
There was certainly nothing objectionable in all this-at least
nothing of which the defendant can complain. The evidence, in
my opinion, when taken in connection with the facts admitted by
the plaintiff's answer, was ample to hold the defendant to the liability which the law imposes upon innkeepers; and had the verdict
been the other way the plaintiff might have had good ground for
complaining of that part of the charge which seemed to leave it
optional with the jury whether they would regard the defendant as
liable in the capacity of innkeeper or as an ordinary bailee.
The additional remarks of the presiding judge were mostly called
forth by the numerous requests of the defendant's counsel, and
related to some particular statement of fact made by the witnesses
upon the part of defence, and in a degree, if not wholly, disputed
or dJenied by the plaintiff. So far as these remarks can be regarded
as expressing inferentially the opinion of the judge as to the weight
or strength of the evidence on either side, they form no ground for
exception or for setting aside a verdict amply supported as this was
by the evidence: Carver vs. Jackson, 4 Pet. 1; Commonwealth
vs. Child, 10 Pick. 252; Foster vs. Steele, 5 Scott, 28; aardner
vs. Picket, 19 Wend. 186. But I do not admit that the language
of the judge was objectionable in any degree. The defendant's
counsel required of him to charge as to the rule of law, which

WISWELL ET ALS. vs. STARR ET ALS.

would be applicable if the jury should believe certain statements of
the witnesses produced by the defence. In. complying with this
request, he very properly called the attention of the jury to the
different version of the same matter given by the other side. To
this extent only can it be said that his remarks affected the defendant unfavorably.
Looking at the whole case, I am of opinion that the charge
was not only right in every material point, but was not calculated
to and did not in any sense mislead the jury.
Order denying a new trial, and judgment affirmed.
Tyler and Brown, for plaintiff.
Townsend, Dyett, and Raymond, for defendant.

- n the S.upreme Judicial Court of Maine, January, 1861.
ARNO WISWELL ET ALS.) RECEIVERS OF HANCOCK BANK,

vs.

JOHN N.

STARR ET ALS.
1. Each stockholder in a bank in this State is liable to make good all losses sustained
by the pecuniary inability of the directors, by whose mismanagement the bank
has sustained a loss, to an amount not exceeding the amount of hi' stock at the time.
2. Each stockholder is also liable, at the expiration of the charter, for the redemption of all unpaid bills, in proportion to the stock he then holds. The sum to
be contributed by each will be in proportion to the whole number of shares
actually held at the expiration of the charter, whether such holders are within
or without the jurisdiction of the Court.
3. If the whole number of shares necessary to make up the capital stock named
in the charter does not appear on the books, or otherwise to be held by any persons, the liability will be apportioned according to the number of shares actually
held, and not upon the whole capital named in the charter.
4. When one of the receivers named in the bills is also a stockholder, the bill cannot be sustained, as the same person cannot be both a complainant and respondent, but the bill may be amended, on motion.
5. The charter of a bank expires, within the meaning of the statute, when an injunction is made perpetual.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-The bill in substance alleges that the Hancock
Bank was incorporated March 21, 1853, with a capital of $50,000,
in shares of $100 each, and subsequently went into operation; that
CUTTING,
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Ts.
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on September 19, 1857, the bank commissioners represented to a
justice of this Court, " that upon examining said bank they were of
opinion that its condition was such as to render its further progress
hazardous to the public," &c., and prayed "for an injunction to
restrain said incorporation from further proceeding with its business," &c.
Whereupon, on September 21, a temporary injunction was
granted, which, on September 30, on a hearing, was modified, and
on November 20, of the same year, was made perpetual, and the complainants were-duly appointed receivers, qualified, and proceeded in
the regular discharge of their duties.
And it is further alleged, that all the property of the bank, when
reduced to cash, was $8,605 64, and that the claims against the
bank, presented and allowed, amounted to the sum of $16,107 70 ;
that John N. Starr was an original and present holder of ten shares,
together with twenty-one others, owning in like manner one hundred and sixty-seven shares; that twenty-seven other individuals,
not originally, were stockholders on Sept. 30, 1857, owning one
hundred and ninety-nine shares ; that since that time seven others
have transferred their stock, being fifty-seven shares; and to four
persons nineteen shares have been transferred, five of which were
to Samuel Waterhouse, one of the receivers; that the receivers, in
their bwn names, but in behalf of the claimants, file this bill in
equity against the persons named and liable as stockholders, praying that they shall be made to contribute to the payment of the
debts of the corporation.
To this bill John N. Starr alone appears by his counsel, and files
a general demurrer. We say that he alone appears, because the
term, "and others," is too indefinite to create a responsibility, thus
presenting various questions 'under the banking law for the first
time to be adjudicated.
The statute in force at the time the Hancock Bank was chartered
-was that of 1841, (Act of Amendment, chap. 1, sec. 8,) and we cite
only those sections having application to the questions raised. Sec.
1. "Every bank which now is or shall hereafter be incorporated
under the authority of this State, except savings banks, shall be
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governed by the following rules, and sulbject to all the'duties, limitations, liabilities, and provisions contained in this chapter."
Sec. 45. "The holders of stock in any bank at the time when its
charter may expire shall be liable, in their individual capacities, for
the redemption and payment of all bills which may have been issuedby said bank, and which shall remain unpaid, in proportion to the
stock they may respectively hold at the dissolution of the charter," &c.
Sec. 46, among other things, provides, that "any holder of any
bill or bills issued by any bank, which bill or bills, after the expiration of its charter, shall remain unredeemed, and which may have been
duly demanded of such bank, may pursue his remedy by a bill of
equity, to be prosecuted in the Supreme Judicial Court."
Next in order is the statute of 1855, ch. 164, which purposes not
to change, alter, or ificrease the liabilities of stockholders, but in
some respects to change the remedy by transferring certain powers
to the receivers, for sec. 9 contains this language: "Nor shall
anything in this act be construed to increase the amount for which
the stockholders of any bank may be liable under existing laws."
Still, notwithstanding, the liabilities of stockholders were so guarded,
sections 4, 5, and 6, of the same chapter, instead of "all bills which
may have been issued by said bank," refer to claims and claimants,
terms sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all the indebtness of
the bank.
After a perpetual injunction, and the appointment of receivers,
sec. 6 provides, that "if it be made to appear to the Court that the
assets aforesaid are insufficient to pay the said claims against the
bank, said receivers shall forthwith file their bill in equity in their
own names, but in behalf of the claimants, against the persons
who are or were stockholders of such bank, and by law may be liable to contribute to the payment of its debts."
The statute of 1857, which is a revision of all prior statutes upon
the subject of banking then in force, provides remedies for the creditors by a bill in equity against 'the stockholders upon the event of
certain contingencies, viz:
First. In case of the pecuniary inability of the directors, by
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whose management the bank has sustained a loss, each stockholder
shall be liable therefor to an amount not exceeding the amount of
his stock at that time.-Sec. 43.
Second. The holders of stock in any bank, at the expiration of
its charter, shall be liable, in their individual capacitieg, for the
redemption and payments of all bills issued by. said bank and
remaining unpaid, in proportion to the stock they then hold.-Sec. 46.
Third. The receivers, after their appointment, instead of the
claimants, are to file their bill in equity in their own names, but iii
behalf of the claimants, against the persons liable as stockholders
to contribute to the payment of the debts.-Secs. 73, 75.
The charter of the Hancock Bank expired by operation of law
on Nov. 20, 1857, when the injunction was made perpetual and the
receivers were appointed: Crease vs. Babcock, 23 Pick. 334. At
that time, as the general law was that under which they accepted
the charter, each stockholder became liable in their individual capacity for the redemption and payment of all bills issued by the bank,
and remaining unpaid, in proportion to the stock they then held,
which proportion is not limited to the amount of their stock, as in
the case of loss by the mismanagement of the directors; but they
are not responsible for all the debts or claims of the creditors, and
the claims denominated debts, sec. 73, and described in the bill,
must be construed to mean only the unpaid bills. Any other construction would increase the liability of stockholders by legislation
subsequent to chartered rights, and would be directly opposed to the
express declaration of the Legislature in their public act of 1855,
before cited.
All the stockholders should be embraced in the bill, but only such
can be made to contribute as are within the jurisdiction of this Court,
by residing or having attachable propprty within the State. And,
although the bill is against all jointly, yet each may answer seve-rally and independently, and the sum to be contributed by each will
be in proportion to the whole number of shares held at the expiration of the charter, whether such holders were within or without the
jurisdiction.
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It appears that the capital stock was $50,000, and should have
been represented-by the holders of 500 shares ; whereas it is alleged
that on September 30, 1857, a short time before the final injunction,
only 376 shares were so represented.
It is true that the statute of 1841 required that one-half, at least,
of the capital stock should be paid in in gold and silver money
before a bank could go into operation, which fact was to be ascertained and certified to the office of the Secretary of State by the
bank commissioners, aided by the oath of a majority of the bank
directors; and, in like manner, the other half within twelve months
from the date of the charter. But the bill avers that the charter
was accepted; the corporation organized and went into operation.
It is to be presumed that the State commissioners discharged their
official duties, that the directors' oaths were not false, that the semiannual returns were made correctly and in good faith, and that the
corporation from its organization, during a period of some years,
under State supervision, was conducted according to law; but when
or in what manner the deficient shares were lost or merged it no
where appears. Whatever may be the legal relations between the
corporation and its members, it would be inequitable in those who
have put the machine in motion to escape responsibility to the
public under a plea of fraud and deception.
The bill bears date Sept. 29, 1859, and not being for a discovery,
or praying for an injunction, need not be verified by oath. The
transferring of shares, subsequent to the dissolution of the corporation by the perpetual injunction, can have no effect to relieve to
prior holders of such shares from their responsibility, nor even during the pendency of the temporary suspension, unless transacted in
good faith and not with a design to escape existing liability: Marcy
vs. Clark, 17 Mass. 330.
It is inferable, from an allegation in the bill, that Samuel Waterhouse, Esq., at the time he was appointed a receiver, was a stockholder in the bank, and has been declared against as such. He
cannot be both a complainant and respondent; the latter he must
be, as has been shown; the former he would not have been, had such
fact come to the knowledge of the judge before his appointment.

